

Type and level of studies: Phd				
Title of the study program: Economics				
Subject title: Microeconomic analysis 2-D				
Subject code: DMAN				
Number of ECTS: 9				
Subject status (Compulsory / Elective): Elective				
Teacher/s (Name, last name): Stojan Babic, Dejan Trifunovic				
Number of active teaching lessons:				Other lessons
Lectures: 3	Practice classes:	Other forms of teaching:	Study research work: 3	
Prerequisite: No				
Subject objective: Microeconomic Analysis 2-D is complementary Microeconomic Analysis 1- D and studies topics that have not been analysed in the previous course, with a detailed consideration of game theory and asymmetric information. This course is primarily intended for PhD students in economics and finance, but also for other PhD students who want to expand their knowledge of microeconomics.				
Subject outcome (gained knowledge): PhD students gain advanced knowledge of general equilibrium, which is of great importance for research in microeconomics, macroeconomics and finance. In addition, central banks in developed countries use dynamic stochastic models of general equilibrium for analysing and forecasting economic activities. The course deals with topics from financial economics that are important for understanding the functioning of financial markets and institutions. Game theory and asymmetric information is discussed in more detail at the higher level of analysis than at the previous course, enabling students to acquire knowledge about strategic decision-making at the firm level as well as about creating optimal contracts. Students also study auctions as a special case of mechanism design. In addition to academic significance, auctions have a wide range application in practice. In methodological terms, in addition to static analysis and comparative statics, PhD students also acquire knowledge from dynamic analysis.				
Subject content/structure: general equilibrium, analysis of general equilibrium, general equilibrium with uncertainty, intertemporal choice, asset markets, externalities and public goods, static and dynamic games, adverse selection, signaling and screening, principal-agent problem, private value auctions, auctions with interdependent values, multi-unit auctions.				
Teaching methods: Lectures and exercises for students.				
Grading (maximum number of points 100)				
Pre-examination obligations	Points	Final exam	Points	
Activities during lectures	40	Written exam	60	
Practice lessons		Oral exam		
Colloquium/a			
Semester papers				
Literature:				
No.	Author	Title	Publisher	Year
1	Hal Varian	Microeconomic Analysis	Third Edition, Norton	1992
2	Andreu Mas Colell, Michael Whinston and Jerry Green	Microeconomic Theory	Oxford University Press	1995
3	Vijay Krishna	Auction theory	San Diego, Academic Press	2009